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The idea that people can experience two oppositely valenced emotions has been
controversial ever since early attempts to investigate the construct of mixed emotions.
This meta-analysis examined the robustness with which mixed emotions have been
elicited experimentally. A systematic literature search identified 63 experimental studies
that instigated the experience of mixed emotions. Studies were distinguished according
to the structure of the underlying affect model—dimensional or discrete—as well as
according to the type of mixed emotions studied (e.g., happy-sad, fearful-happy,
positive-negative). The meta-analysis using a random-effects model revealed a moderate
to high effect size for the elicitation of mixed emotions (d =IG+ 0.77), which remained
consistent regardless of the structure of the affect model, and across different types of
mixed emotions. Several methodological and design moderators were tested. Studies
using the minimum index (i.e., the minimum value between a pair of opposite valenced
affects) resulted in smaller effect sizes, whereas subjective measures of mixed emotions
increased the effect sizes. The presence of more women in the samples was also
associated with larger effect sizes. The current study indicates that mixed emotions are
a robust, measurable and non-artifactual experience. The results are discussed in terms
of the implications for an affect system that has greater versatility and flexibility than
previously thought.
Keywords: mixed emotions, mixed feelings, emotional complexity, affect model, meta-analysis
Emotions are sometimes more complex than the notions we possess to communicate how we feel,
above all for those affects that combine two opposite valenced emotions at the same time (i.e.,
mixed emotions). Mixed emotions have been defined as affective experiences characterized by the
co-activation of two emotions, usually opposite in valence (Larsen et al., 2001), like for example,
feeling happy and sad. Other definitions have considered mixed emotions as the intraindividual
correlation between the opposite dimensions of positive affect and negative affect, where values
closer to zero reflect greater emotional complexity (Grühn et al., 2013). This implies that mixed
emotions are experienced over time, so that mixed emotions can be also studied as a trait. Nev-
ertheless, in the present research mixed emotions are understood as transient feeling states that
involve two opposite affects.
Affects are characterized by subjective feelings, and can be divided into two main cate-
gories: emotions and moods. Emotions are usually briefer than moods, and occur in response
to a specific eliciting stimulus whereas moods are more diffuse and reflect multiple inputs.
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As such, mixed emotion experience can be considered to be a
form of mood (Rafaeli et al., 2007), although the present work
focuses on the emotions that contribute to the experience.
The feasibility of experiencing mixed emotions has aroused
controversy since the beginning of the scientific psychology era.
Kellogg (1915) showed that rapidly alternating the presentation
of a pleasant (e.g., a cat) and an unpleasant (e.g., a surgical inter-
vention) stimulus can instigate the experience of mixed feelings.
He suggested that two opposite streams of feelings can oper-
ate continuously, unless one of these feelings is much greater
in intensity, in which case, the stronger prevails. Shortly after,
Young (1918) argued that suchmixed feelings represent a “mean-
ing error,” that is, people reporting mixed feelings confused
emotions felt with emotion intellectualization, which refers to
a rationalization of an event using emotion words without the
corresponding feeling.
Over time, research interest has grown but controversies in
the field survive. Thus, most of the research studying this com-
plex emotional experience has been dedicated to demonstrating
that mixed emotions are not a product of: demand effects, lay
theories of mixed emotions, vacillation, or measurement prob-
lems (e.g., Larsen and McGraw, 2011, 2014; Schimmack, 2001,
2005; Rafaeli and Revelle, 2006; Larsen and Green, 2013). How-
ever, the extant research investigating mixed emotions has yet to
systematically examine whether the variety of designs and stud-
ies performed until now consistently support the experience of
mixed emotions.
Research on mixed emotions varies substantially in terms
of several variables: (a) the underlying model of affect con-
sidered (i.e., dimensional or discrete emotions), (b) the type
of mixed emotions studied, (c) the type of measure used
to assess the presence and intensity of mixed emotions, and
(d) the induction procedure used to activate mixed emo-
tions. Hence, it is worth integrating and assessing the diverse
accumulated evidence to evaluate how robust and consistent
mixed emotions actually are. According to Wimsatt (1981),
a robust phenomenon is one which is sufficiently invari-
ant under a variety of conditions to reach identical conclu-
sions about the process under scrutiny. Thus, in the present
research we have assessed the robustness of mixed emotions
by examining whether researchers have been equally success-
ful in experimentally eliciting mixed emotions using different:
models of affect, combinations of emotions, measures, and pro-
cedures. In this quantitative review, we use these variations
to examine the robustness of mixed emotions as an affective
experience.
To accomplish this goal, we first briefly review models of
affect and the different types of mixed emotions that have been
used to understand mixed emotions. Next we describe the meth-
ods and procedures through which researchers have tried to
reveal the activation of mixed emotions. To do this we con-
textualize the methodological progress as reflecting an effort
to support the basic assumptions behind the phenomenon of
mixed emotions. Finally, we present a meta-analysis of exper-
imental studies investigating the experience of mixed emo-
tions and we discuss its implications for understanding mixed
emotions.
Mapping the Terrain of Mixed Emotions:
Underlying Models and Types
We start by introducing the distinction between mixed emotions
as the co-occurrence of oppositely valenced affects and emotion-
blends as a category including all possible experiences combining
more than one emotion (Scherer, 1998). Emotion blends have
been largely studied and accepted in the emotion literature (Izard,
1972, 1992; Polivy, 1981; Folkman and Lazarus, 1985; Diener
and Iran-Nejad, 1986; Smith and Ellsworth, 1987; Oatley and
Johnson-Laird, 1996; Scherer, 1998). For example, people report
combined feelings of both happiness and excitement or both anx-
iety and fear (e.g., Zelenski and Larsen, 2000; Vansteelandt et al.,
2005). Thus emotion blends of similar valence are uncontentious.
However, there are a number of important issues (e.g., cul-
tural differences, emotional complexity) one of these is whether
oppositely valenced affects can be experienced simultaneously
(Lindquist and Barrett, 2008), which forms the focus of the
present review. Views about the possibility of consciously experi-
encing two opposite affects depend, to an extent, on the underly-
ing model of affect to which researchers subscribe, with the main
distinction being between dimensional and basic models.
Mixed Emotions and Dimensional Models of
Affect
Dimensional models of affect propose that the best representa-
tion of the underlying structure of feelings is to locate them on
dimensions. People usually describe their feelings as positive or
negative, pleasant or unpleasant, which suggests that one of the
fundamental dimensions is valence. Some dimensional models
of affect have postulated that opposite ends of the positive-
negative dimension (Russell and Carroll, 1999;Watson and Telle-
gen, 1999) and the underlying appetition-aversion affect systems
(Grey, 1982; Lang, 1995) correspond to mutually exclusive feel-
ings. The implication of this is that, for example, happiness and
sadness cannot be experienced simultaneously, which challenges
the idea that it is possible to experience mixed emotions.
In particular, scholars ascribing to the circumplex model of
affect have asserted that mixed emotions are merely result of
measurement problems or a reactive phenomenon related to
expectancies of participants and/or researchers and arise from
confusion in reports of emotion (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau,
2009). In the circumplex model, affect is represented by two
orthogonal dimensions of valence and activation forming a cir-
cular space around which affect-items can be descriptively orga-
nized (Russell, 1980). The dimension of valence reflects the level
of pleasantness/unpleasantness felt; whereas the dimension of
activation reflects the level of arousal characteristic of the affect.
Affects lying at opposite ends of each of these two bipolar dimen-
sions are mutually exclusive, which means that an increase in
high-activated pleasure implies the reduction of low-activated
displeasure and vice versa. If an affective experience has a sin-
gle location on these bipolar dimensions, mixed emotions are
therefore an oxymoron.
In contrast, the Evaluative Space Model (ESM; Cacioppo
et al., 1999, 2004) contends that affect can be characterized by
a dimension of positive affect and another dimension of negative
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affect forming a bivariate space in which it is possible to describe
multiple variations of positive and negative emotions, including
mixed emotions. The ESM (Cacioppo et al., 1999, 2004) stipu-
lates that positive affect and negative affect are biologically basic
substrates of the affect system with identifiable brain structures,
functionally represented throughout different levels of the neural
system. This biological architecture allowsmultiple activation pat-
terns, such as reciprocal, independent or co-activation patterns
(Norris et al., 2010; Norman et al., 2011). Although physical con-
straints may make the affect system appear as bipolar in nature,
its neurobiological architecture is better understood as bivariate
(Norman et al., 2011).
Mixed Emotions and Theories of Basic Emotion
Some theories of basic emotion also support the experience of
mixed emotions. Theories of basic emotions usually consider
emotional experiences as being measureable and physiologically
distinct phenomena characterized by a small set of emotions
(Izard, 1972). Izard (1992) argued that basic emotions can be
blended to form new emotions in accordance with specific con-
ditions occurring in the environment. Like mixing paint colors
on a palette, mixed emotions result from the different possible
combinations of basic emotions, such as happiness, sadness, anx-
iety or disgust. Izard also noted that “one emotion can almost
instantaneously elicit another emotion that amplifies, attenu-
ates, inhibits or interacts with the original emotional experience”
(Izard, 1972, p. 77). Although this conceptualization is distinct
from the definition of mixed emotions used in this study because
it suggests the emergence of new emotions by blending basic
emotions, it is interesting to note that, in this theory, emotions
are freely allowed to interact regardless of valence, which suggests
that mixed emotion experiences are feasible. This clarification is
important because studies investigating blended emotions that
form new emotions, as suggested by Izard (1992), do not fall
within the focus of the present study.
More closely linked to the current understanding of mixed
emotions, Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1996) proposed that indi-
viduals react to events by making multiple cognitive evaluations,
which in turn, may elicit multiple basic emotions simultaneously
or in rapid alternation many of which are mixed emotions, giv-
ing rise to facial expressions combining more than one basic
emotion, as previously demonstrated by Ekman and O’Sullivan
(1991). Recent evidence supports this assertion demonstrating
that it is possible to identify 21 different and consistent facial
expressions (Du et al., 2014), many of which reflect combinations
of basic emotions (e.g., happily disgusted).
Types of Mixed Emotions
Happy-sad has been, by large, the most common type of mixed
emotion studied (e.g., Larsen et al., 2001; Williams and Aaker,
2002; Fong, 2006; Larsen and Green, 2013). For example, an
emblematic study showed that students who had just moved to
their dormitories felt significantly sadder but also happier than
in a typical day before this event (Larsen et al., 2001, Study 2).
Nevertheless, several other types of mixed emotions have been
investigated, including the co-activation of fear and happiness
(e.g., Andrade and Cohen, 2007), disgust and amusement (e.g.,
Hemenover and Schimmack, 2007), and hope and fear (e.g., Bee
and Madrigal, 2013). Furthermore, different studies have con-
ceived the experience of mixed emotions as reflecting either
the co-activation of different dimensions of affect such as posi-
tive and negative affect (e.g., Henderson and Norris, 2013) and
pleasure-displeasure (e.g., Schimmack and Colcombe, 2007) or
as reflecting the experience of different discrete emotions such
as happy-sad or hope-fear. The diversity of types of mixed emo-
tions, including both dimensional and discrete conceptualiza-
tions, implies relevant theoretical consequences. If consistent evi-
dence about the experience of mixed emotions is found across
different models of affect, then it is possible to suggest that mixed
emotions are a universal affective experience, that is, not nec-
essarily restricted to certain “traditional” emotion combinations
(e.g., happy-sad). Similarly, this diversity may suggest that the
affective system is flexible enough to permit a plurality of affective
experiences ranging from bipolarity to mixed emotions.
In summary, it is possible to describe mixed emotions as a
multifaceted emotional experience, which involves the simulta-
neous experience of different combinations of opposing emo-
tions. Both dimensional and basic emotions approaches have
theorized the possibility of experiencing mixed emotions. It is
important to note, however, that several studies exploring the
activation of mixed emotions (e.g., Andrade and Cohen, 2007;
Hemenover and Schimmack, 2007) have focused on discrete
emotional experiences, thereby using a distinct model of affect,
without explicitly ascribing to a basic emotion approach. An
empirical examination of the consistency with whichmixed emo-
tions have been elicited for different underlying models of affect
and different types of mixed emotions has not been previously
conducted. This examination is needed to determine whether
mixed emotions apply to the universe of emotions, or whether
they are restricted to particular kinds or combinations of emo-
tions and therefore represent a more specific phenomenon.
Measurement and Elicitation of Mixed
Emotions
Different measures and elicitation procedures have been devel-
oped to demonstrate that opposite affects can be experi-
enced concurrently and that mixed emotions are a genuine
affective experience (Larsen and McGraw, 2014). These two
assumptions—simultaneity of opposing emotions and the inte-
gral experience of mixed emotions—organize ongoing efforts to
demonstrate the experience of mixed emotions. This section
describes these two assumptions, explains the measures used
to evaluate the presence/intensity of mixed emotions and the
procedures used to elicit mixed emotions.
The Simultaneity of Opposing Emotions
The assumption of simultaneity is that mixed emotions reflect the
co-activation of different emotions, usually described as oppo-
site. According to the ESM (Cacioppo et al., 1999, 2004), simul-
taneity is achieved through two different mechanisms. Firstly,
co-activation can result from perceiving both positive and neg-
ative features of a single stimulus or event (Cacioppo et al., 2011),
which is supported by evidence that indicates attention can be
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directed to at least two steams of information (De Gelder and
Vroomen, 2000). Secondly, co-activation can also result from
alternations between positive and negative stimuli that are fast
enough to produce sustained activation of both (Schimmack and
Colcombe, 2007; Norris et al., 2010). Thus, the experience of feel-
ing two opposite affects simultaneously may result either from
the rapid alternation between emotions or the co-activation of
two emotions.
Other theories of emotion have asserted that only one emo-
tion can be activated and consciously experienced at a given time
(Brehm, 1999; Russell, 2003; Brehm andMiron, 2006). For exam-
ple, Brehm (1999) proposed that emotions provide guidelines for
behavioral responses, consistent with the level of instrumental
difficulty (i.e., deterrence) necessary to attain a certain outcome.
When the deterrence is high enough a new affective response is
activated, which may result in a rapid transition from one emo-
tion into another, but they are not both consciously experienced
at the same time (Brehm and Miron, 2006). However, this does
not necessarily prohibit the experience of mixed emotions. As
suggested by Kellogg (1915), the activation of two opposite affects
in rapid succession can instigate the experience of mixed emo-
tions until the intensity of one affect prevails, as demonstrated by
Schimmack and Colcombe (2007).
The Integral Experience of Mixed Emotions
If mixed feelings are a genuine emotional experience, they
should involve distinctive states of consciousness which are
experienced as personal feelings. Mixed emotions are a com-
plex affective experience and not merely a collection of
independent emotions elicited in response to separate trig-
gers. Even though people can report identifiable environmen-
tal sources of mixed emotions, the subjective feeling reflects
the co-occurrence of both positive and negative emotions.
This approach assumes, therefore, that mixed emotions are
more than the sum of the emotions involved; mixed feel-
ings are in themselves a distinct and integral emotional
experience.
Contrary to this assumption, Greenspan (2003) has indicated
that emotions appear mixed when actually they are different
emotional experiences pertaining to independent events. Thus,
for example, people may report feeling happy and sad because
they are feeling happy in relation to event “A,” and sad in rela-
tion to event “B.” Similarly, people can perceive and verbalize the
contrasting affective qualities of external events, without expe-
riencing any distinctive change in affective experience (Russell,
2003).
However, the subjective experience of mixed emotions is
grounded in the idea that our feelings reflect two genuine affects
converging upon a single reference point, that is, ourselves. For
example, Hunter et al. (2008) found that conflictingmusical stim-
uli (i.e., musical pieces in fast tempo and minor mode) created
more happiness and sadness compared to non-conflicting musi-
cal pieces. This study examined mixed emotions using one (indi-
visible) focus of attention, avoiding alternative interpretations
based on the events surrounding the emotional experience and
supported the assumption that mixed emotions are an integral
experience.
Measures of Mixed Emotions
In order to capture the simultaneity and the subjective expe-
rience of mixed emotions, several measures have been devel-
oped. Following Hershfield and Larsen (2012), it is possible to
distinguish four different measurement methods. The first cor-
responds to measuring the extent to which people experience
positive affect, negative affect, or both together continuously (e.g.,
Larsen et al., 2004; Larsen and McGraw, 2011; Larsen and Green,
2013). This simultaneous measure asks participants to press a
button every time they feel good and release the button when
they no longer feel good and press another button whenever they
feel bad and release it when they no longer feel bad. Participants
can press both buttons simultaneously, when feeling good and
bad, and can abstain from pressing a button if they feel nei-
ther good nor bad. This captures mixed emotions in real-time,
so avoiding confounding reports due to timescale or characteris-
tics of the scale used. This measure is usually operationalized as
the amount of time participants spend pressing the two buttons
simultaneously.
Secondly, based on previous works on attitudinal ambivalence
(e.g., Priester and Petty, 1996), the intensity of mixed emotions
has been estimated using the minimum value between positive
and negative emotions. For example, if an individual reports feel-
ing “4” for happiness on a scale from 1 to 5, and also reports
feeling “2” for sadness, the minimum index of mixed emotions
will be “2” (i.e., the minimum value); if one of the emotions
measured (e.g., sadness) is not felt, the minimum value would
be zero indicating that mixed emotion was not experienced.
This index therefore reflects the intensity of the experience of
mixed emotions, but it does not reflect differences in the balance
between the two emotions. For example, in the same example,
the index would remain at “2” even if happiness increased to
its maximum value “5.” Nevertheless, a measure of mixed emo-
tions based on a minimum value is considered more appropriate
than a simple correlation between positive and negative affect
because it reflects the intensity of mixed emotions (Schimmack,
2001, 2005). Other studies of mixed emotion have used simi-
lar measures based on a minimum value, such as the similarity
intensity index (e.g., Williams and Aaker, 2002; Hong and Lee,
2010).
Thirdly, it is possible to infer the simultaneous experience
of mixed emotions by counting the number of occasions dur-
ing which people experience each emotion measured. By count-
ing the occasions on which two or more emotions of opposite
valence are experienced, it is possible to establish a raw esti-
mation of the presence (or absence) of mixed emotions. For
example, Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1996) provided evidence
that people can experience mixed emotions (happiness-sadness)
on almost 14% of occasions. Similar measures of mixed emo-
tions can be constructed by evaluating the frequency of opposite
emotions experienced across different groups (e.g., experimen-
tal versus control) completing an emotional questionnaire. For
example, this may involve using a manipulation procedure to
test whether an experimental group experiences a greater extent
of two opposite emotions compared to a control group where
the manipulation is not present (e.g., McGraw and Warren,
2010).
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Finally, mixed emotions have been measured by asking people
directly in a questionnaire whether they are experiencing mixed
feelings. The specific subjective experience of emotions is an
inherent part of emotional life (e.g., Helm, 2009), and self-reports
of subjective feelings can be useful in this regard. For example,
Berrios et al. (2015) demonstrated that subjective self-reports of
mixed feelings are useful and consistent indicators of mixed emo-
tions. Interestingly, the investigation (Study 2) produced equiva-
lent results for subjective measures of mixed emotions and the
minimum index.
Elicitation of Mixed Emotions
Several procedures have been developed to elicit mixed feelings.
Common emotion induction procedures have been films (e.g.,
Larsen et al., 2001), music (e.g., Hunter et al., 2008), pictures (e.g.,
Schimmack and Colcombe, 2007), and advertisements (Andrade
and Cohen, 2007). For example, in one study Larsen andMcGraw
(2011, Study 1a) demonstrated that people experienced both hap-
piness and sadness whilst watching a film-clip from themovie Life
is Beautiful. In recent years more ecologically valid techniques
such as recalling personal experiences in response to conflicting
goals (e.g., Berrios et al., 2015), have been employed to expand
understanding of the precursors of mixed emotions.
In summary, different elicitation procedures have been devel-
oped and tested to investigate the presence and intensity of mixed
emotions. Moreover, multiple measures have been developed to
support both the simultaneity and the integral experience of
mixed emotions. From the measures described, it is possible to
suggest that the simultaneous measure of mixed emotions would
have more consistent effect sizes compared to other measures in
identifying the co-activation of opposite affects because it over-
comes problems arising from the timescale and the measurement
scale used. Additionally, subjective measures of mixed emotions
rely more on the second assumption, according to which mixed
emotions can be both mentally represented and experienced.
The diversity of measures and procedures used to study mixed
feelings has yet to be integrated in terms of their relative influ-
ence in capturing and characterizing the experience of mixed
emotions.
The Present Research
The present research examines and quantifies the robustness of
mixed emotions by meta-analyzing extant research. If mixed
emotions are a robust phenomenon, they should be consistent
over and above any artifactual variable (such as measurement
error or design characteristic) and across different theoretical or
methodological characteristics of the studies included. Thismeta-
analysis investigated the effects of: (a) distinguishing between
dimensional and discrete emotions approaches to the study of
mixed feelings, and (b) the type of mixed emotions tested. Dif-
ferences arising from separate models and different types of
mixed emotions therefore enable conclusions to be drawn about
the degree of generalizability and specificity of mixed feelings.
Several methodological characteristics were included as moder-
ators to determine their impact in the elicitation of mixed emo-
tions, including: (a) measures used, (b) induction procedures
(c) design characteristics, and (d) demographic characteristics.
The measures used are of particular value as they reflect dif-
ferent assumptions about mixed emotions (i.e., simultaneity of
opposing emotions and the integral experience of mixed emo-
tions), so evidence for the validity of these assumptions can be
gleaned from the relative effect size produced. Induction proce-
dures and design characteristics (i.e., within or between person
designs) were included because they help rule out the possibility
that mixed emotions are artifacts of study design, rather than a
genuine emotional experience. Finally, demographic characteris-
tics were included to enable future research to focus on promising
samples. Specifically, age and gender were studied because several
studies have found a positive association between age and expe-
riencing mixed emotions (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2000; Ong and
Bergeman, 2004), while other studies have shown variations in
the experience of mixed emotions as a function of gender (e.g.,
Larsen et al., 2001; Berrios et al., 2015).
Method
Selection of Studies
The sample of studies used in the meta-analysis was obtained
by conducting a computerized search (via Web of Knowledge,
and PsycINFO, Dissertation Abstracts International) for articles
published before January, 2014, using the keywords: “mixed emo-
tions,” “mixed feelings,” “emotional blends,” “emotional ambiva-
lence,” “contrasting emotions,” or “emotional complexity.” Articles
had to include the respective terms either in the title, abstract
or keywords. Reference lists in some articles were inspected to
identify additional sources for inclusion. Furthermore, emails to
relevant researchers in the field were sent in order to incorpo-
rate potential unpublished studies. Similarly, a public advertise-
ment was placed on ResearchGate (an international online social
network for researchers) inviting researchers to share any unpub-
lished studies investigatingmixed emotions. The literature search
identified 826 articles and dissertations.
Four inclusion criteria were considered for the meta-analysis.
First, studies had to employ an experimental design and recruit a
human, non-clinical sample. Experiments were chosen because:
(a) they provide a meaningful counterfactual condition(s) against
which to compare the activation of mixed emotions, and (b)
the allocation of participants is random—or at least quasi-
random—enhancing the adequate interpretation of the effect
sizes. Experiments based on comparisons between cultures were
only included if the samples contained participants from differ-
ent cultural backgrounds randomly allocated to the experimental
and control condition(s).
Second, studies had to manipulate the experience of mixed
emotions using films, images, music, or any other procedure
that was deemed by the studies to instigate the experience of
mixed emotions. Importantly, studies had to manipulate mixed
emotions and report the effectiveness of this manipulation on
participants’ emotional experience in comparison with emo-
tional experience in specific control condition(s) (i.e., between-
participant designs) and/or in comparison with participants’
emotional experience before the corresponding manipulation
(between-within-participant designs).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 428
Berrios et al. A meta-analysis of mixed emotions
Third, studies had to measure mixed emotions, that is, stud-
ies needed to consider the experience of two opposite affects
as co-occurring; studies in which other emotional blends were
measured were not included (e.g., anxious-fear). The classifi-
cation of mixed emotions was based on the hedonic valence
of the emotions involved. Thus studies were included if they
tested a positively and a negatively valenced emotion. Similarly,
if the study incorporated a dimensional approach, the follow-
ing combinations were included; positive-negative affect, positive
activated-negative activated affect, pleasant-unpleasant affect.
Fourth, studies had to report a measure of mixed emotions
that reflected the magnitude of the mixed emotion experienced
(for example, by using the common indices of mixed emo-
tions described in the introduction). Correlational indices were
not considered unless two or more correlations were compared
between experimental and control conditions (e.g., Andrade and
Cohen, 2007, Study 3a). General correlational indices were not
considered, as correlations are not an appropriate measure for
the experience of mixed emotions (Schimmack, 2001).
Of the 826 articles and theses identified by the search, 47 arti-
cles met the inclusion criteria from which we were able to com-
pute effect sizes for 35 articles involving a total of 63 independent
studies. The other 12 articles were excluded because we could nei-
ther compute precise effect sizes nor estimate effects in the studies
reported; authors were contacted where possible in an attempt to
include these data. Each of the selected articles is identified by
an asterisk in the reference list. We computed precise effect sizes
for 60 studies (95%) on the basis of information in the article;
whereas for 3 studies (5%), we had to estimate some or all values
based on the significance levels reported.
Selection of Comparisons within Studies and
Selection of Moderators
Two types of comparisons were examined in order to provide
information about the relevance of different models for investi-
gating mixed emotions, and the nature of mixed emotions. First,
a comparison between dimensional models of affect and discrete
emotions approaches was performed; studies considering dimen-
sions of affect (e.g., positive-negative affect) were compared
with studies in which discrete emotions were measured (e.g.,
happy-sad). Second, we compared different types of mixed emo-
tions, that is, happy-sad, fear-happy, disgust-amusement, hope-
fear, positive-negative affect, and pleasant-unpleasant affect. Such
comparisons help to clarify the generalizability and diversity of
mixed emotions.
To evaluate the effect of the moderator variables, studies were
coded according to two methodological factors and three study
characteristics. Firstly, the measure of mixed emotions used was
coded based on a 4-fold classification: (i) simultaneous measures
of mixed emotions, (ii) measures of mixed emotions using the
minimum index or derivations of a similar formula, such as the
similarity-intensity index (e.g., Williams and Aaker, 2002), (iii)
measures of mixed emotions based on the frequency of opposing
affects, and (iv) subjective measures of mixed emotions. Studies
reporting a combination of measures were coded as a “mix of
measures,” and the effect sizes obtained from each measure were
averaged. Secondly, the emotion induction procedure was coded
according to whether ads, films, music, pictures, personal experi-
ences, simulation or imagination (e.g., participants imagine a sit-
uation or remember a recent event), or another—unclassified—
induction procedure was used. Thirdly, the design character-
istic of each study was coded according to whether it used a
within-person or between-person design. Finally, two demo-
graphic characteristics—mean age and percentage of women—
were coded. Further details about the study characteristics and
the effect sizes for each study are provided in Table 1.
Calculation of Effect Sizes
We calculated effect sizes that represented the degree to which
mixed emotions were elicited following the affect-manipulation
procedure used in each study. Thus the presence of mixed
emotions was represented by a positive effect size; whereas the
absence of mixed emotions was represented by values close
to zero. Although it seemed unlikely, more mixed emotions
among the control, relative to the experimental, condition (or
before, relative to after, the affect induction) would be indi-
cated by a negative effect size. The inclusion of both between-
person and within-person study designs meant that we had to
analyze data from different experimental designs. We there-
fore adopted Morris and DeShon’s (2002) method for combin-
ing results across independent-groups and repeated measures
designs. As the research question concerned the robustness and
consistency in the activation of mixed emotions across differ-
ent theoretical and methodological distinctions, all effect sizes
were transformed into a common independent-groups metric
(dIG) following formulations and procedures indicated byMorris
and DeShon (2002). Transforming effect sizes into alternate met-
rics requires an estimate of the population correlation between
pre- and post-test scores (Morris and DeShon, 2002). This is a
common procedure to correct for measurement error which has
been viewed as a typical study artifact in meta-analysis (Schmidt,
2010). We calculated this estimate using data from the strongest
study available (Schimmack, 2005) in terms of the sample size,
encompassing 1118 participants (16% of the total summed sam-
ple), and then we corrected for this estimate (ρ = 0.35) in the rest
of the studies.
Meta-Analytic Strategy
Computations were undertaken using SPSS macros designed by
Wilson (2005). Weighted average effect sizes (dIG+) were based
on a random effects model due to the assumption that the true
effect sizes may vary as a function of the different models of
affect and types of mixed emotions reported and as a func-
tion of the characteristics of the population (i.e., proportion of
women and men; ages of the participants within samples; sam-
ples from different countries). The restricted maximum likeli-
hood (REML) method was used to calculate the effect sizes, as it
estimates more conservative standard errors (Raudenbush, 1994)
and REML is more sensitive with small sample sizes (Thomp-
son and Sharp, 1999). Effect sizes were interpreted using Cohen’s
(1992) guidelines which suggest that, d = 0.20 should be con-
sidered a “small” effect size, d = 0.50 is a “medium” effect size,
and d = 0.80 is a “large” effect size. These categories were con-
sidered appropriate to the current context because the largest
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 428
Berrios et al. A meta-analysis of mixed emotions
TABLE 1 | Characteristics and effect sizes for studies included in the meta-analysis.
Study Experiment Type of mixed emotion Mixed emotion indicator Induction procedure NE NC Effect size
Aaker et al., 2008 2 Positive, negative MIN Ads 45 1.01
Andrade and Cohen,
2007
2 Fear, happy SIM Other 75 0.58
Andrade and Cohen,
2007
3a Fear, happy SIM Other 81 2.12
Barrett et al., 2010 1 Positive, negative FRQ Music 226 0.52
Bee and Madrigal,
2013
1 Hope, fear MIN Ads 54 106 0.41
Bee and Madrigal,
2013
2 Hope, fear MIN Ads 41 80 0.71
Berrios et al., 2015 1 Positive, negative SUB Personal experiences 22 13 0.84
Berrios et al., 2015 2 Positive, negative MIX Personal experiences 30 27 0.87
Carrera and Oceja,
2007
2 Happy, sad FRQ Pictures 37 39 0.94
Fong, 2006 1 Happy, sad MIX Personal experiences 27 75 0.79
Fong, 2006 2 Happy, sad MIX Film 74 64 0.94
Fong and Tiedens,
2002
1 Positive, negative MIN Simulation 27 25 0.59
Hemenover and
Schimmack, 2007
1 Disgust, amusement MIN Other 49 53 0.48
Henderson and Norris,
2013
1 Positive, negative MIN Simulation 30 1.76
Hershfield et al., 2009 1 Positive, negative MIN Simulation 22 23 1.37
Hershfield et al., 2008 1 Happy, sad MIN Simulation 60 60 0.73
Hershfield et al., 2008 2 Happy, sad MIN Simulation 51 59 0.45
Hong and Lee, 2010 1 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 45 46 0.60
Hong and Lee, 2010 2 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 37 38 0.59
Hong and Lee, 2010 3 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 125 125 0.43
Hong and Lee, 2010 4 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 74 75 0.20
Hong and Lee, 2010 5 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 108 109 0.78
Hunter et al., 2008 1 Happy, sad MIN Music 40 0.70
Hunter et al., 2008 2 Happy, sad MIN Music 40 1.13
Hunter et al., 2010 1 Happy, sad MIN Music 49 0.72
Kreibig et al., 2013 1 Disgust, amusement MIN Film 43 2.50
Ladinig and
Schellenberg, 2012
1 Happy, sad FRQ Music 61 1.20
Larsen and Green,
2013
1 Happy, sad SIM Film 40 2.39
Larsen and Green,
2013
2 Happy, sad SIM Film 55 0.17
Larsen et al., 2009 1a Happy, sad SIM Film 22 25 0.18
Larsen et al., 2009 1b Happy, sad MIN Film 17 22 0.19
Larsen et al., 2009 2 Happy, sad FRQ Film 21 18 0.23
Larsen et al., 2009 3 Happy, sad SIM Film 28 24 0.14
Larsen et al., 2009 4 Happy, sad MIX Film 33 83 0.95
Larsen et al., 2009 5 Happy, sad MIX Film 33 61 0.88
Larsen et al., 2009 6 Happy, sad MIX Film 50 24 0.73
Larsen et al., 2001 1 Happy, sad FRQ Film 177 177 0.88
Larsen et al., 2001 2 Happy, sad FRQ Personal experiences 100 92 0.78
Larsen et al., 2001 3 Happy, sad FRQ Personal experiences 115 0.72
Larsen et al., 2004 1 Positive, negative MIN Simulation 20 0.86
Larsen et al., 2004 2 Positive, negative SIM Simulation 20 0.76
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Study Experiment Type of mixed emotion Mixed emotion indicator Induction procedure NE NC Effect size
Larsen et al., 2009 2 Positive, negative MIN Personal experiences 19 0.97
Larsen and Stastny,
2011
1 Happy, sad SIM Music 21 0.59
Madrigal and Bee,
2005
1 Hope, fear MIN Ads 36 1.23
McGraw and Warren,
2010
3 Disgust, amusement FRQ Simulation 36 0.73
McGraw and Warren,
2010
4 Disgust, amusement FRQ Simulation 80 0.81
McGraw and Warren,
2010
5 Disgust, amusement FRQ Simulation 73 1.27
Oceja and Carrera,
2009
1 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 37 69 0.98
Oceja and Carrera,
2009
2 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 61 29 1.05
Rees et al., 2013 3a Happy, sad SUB Simulation 53 1.80
Rees et al., 2013 3b Happy, sad SUB Simulation 652 1.56
Schimmack and
Colcombe, 1999
1 Pleasure, displeasure FRQ Pictures 36 0.76
Schimmack and
Colcombe, 1999
2 Pleasure, displeasure MIN Pictures 44 0.67
Schimmack, 2001 1 Pleasure, displeasure MIN Pictures 342 0.76
Schimmack, 2005 1 Pleasure, displeasure MIN Pictures 1118 0.39
Schimmack and
Colcombe, 2007
1 Pleasure, displeasure MIN Pictures 80 0.50
Spencer-Rodgers
et al., 2010
1 Positive, negative MIN Other 54 53 0.46
Veilleux et al., 2013 1 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 100 0.67
Williams and Aaker,
2002
1 Happy, sad MIN Ads 204 0.52
Williams and Aaker,
2002
2 Happy, sad MIN Ads 59 70 0.30
Williams and Aaker,
2002
3 Happy, sad MIN Ads 88 0.61
Zhang et al., 2010 1 Happy, sad MIN Simulation 30 0.76
Zhang et al., 2010 2 Happy, sad MIN Simulation 58 0.64
NE , number of participants in the experimental condition; NC, number of participants in the control condition/s; MIN, minimum index or similar indicator; SIM, simultaneous measure
of mixed emotions; FRQ, indicator of mixed emotions based on frequencies; SUB, subjective measure of mixed emotions; MIX, multiple indicators of mixed emotions (implies studies
reporting more than one measure of mixed emotions).
contemporary meta-analysis of the elicitation of emotions in
general (Lench et al., 2011) has reported an average effect size
of 0.51.
The homogeneityQ statistic (Cochran, 1954) was used to eval-
uate the variability in effect sizes from the primary studies. Q is
a diagnostic tool that can be used to determine whether there
is unexplained variability in the studies selected (Shadish and
Haddock, 1994). Homogeneity is rejected when the Q statistic is
significant. The homogeneity Q statistic was also used to com-
pare effect sizes between different models of affect and different
types of mixed emotions. We used the METAF macro for SPSS
(Wilson, 2005) to estimate differences between models of affect
and types of mixed emotions. This macro performs the ana-
log to One-Way ANOVA analysis and is suitable for estimating
random effects models. Similarly, the METAREG macro for
SPSS (Wilson, 2005) was used to conduct meta-regressions to
evaluate 16 potential moderators of effectiveness in the elicitation
of mixed emotions.
Results
The Magnitude of Mixed Emotions as a
Phenomenon
To determine the magnitude of elicited mixed emotions we cal-
culated the sample-weighted average effect size from the primary
studies. The result showed a significant medium to large average
effect size, dIG+ = 0.77, z = 15.82, p < 0.01, with a 95% confi-
dence interval lying between 0.68 and 0.87, based on 63 studies
and a total sample size of 7157 participants. The classification
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of this overall effect size is also medium to large considering a
recent very large (k = 687) meta-analysis on the elicitation of
emotional experiences (g = 0.51; Lench et al., 2011). This indi-
cates that mixed emotions were of sufficient magnitude to be
reliably detected under a variety of conditions. The homogeneity
statistic demonstrated the presence of unexplained heterogeneity,
Q(62) = 341.11, p < 0.01, v = 0.10, which confirmed the perti-
nence of a random effects model for the present meta-analysis.
The corresponding forest plot including all the studies and the
weighted average effect size are shown in Figure 1; studies with
larger sample sizes are represented using proportionally bigger
square symbols, and the diamond symbol reflects the weighted
average effect size. In general, studies with larger sample sizes
(and consequently higher power) were closer to the weighted
average effect size estimated, and only a small portion of studies—
commonly those with the smallest sample sizes—diverged largely
from the average effect size.
Comparing the Experience of Mixed Emotion
between Models of Affect and between Different
Types of Mixed Emotions
There was no significant difference between studies that con-
ceptualized mixed emotions using a dimensional or a discrete
structure of affect, Q(1) = 0.83, n.s. (see Table 2). The aver-
age effect size of mixed emotions measured using dimensions
of affect was medium to large, dIG+ = 0.71, z = 8.28, p <
0.01, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.54 to 0.88, based
on 24 comparisons and a total sample size of 3339. Mixed emo-
tions measured using a discrete emotions approach showed a
medium to large average effect size, dIG+ = 0.81, z = 12.14,
p < 0.01, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.68 to 0.94,
based on 39 comparisons and a total sample size of 3818. This
means that dimensional and discrete emotions approaches pro-
duce similar accounts for the magnitude of experience of mixed
emotions.
Furthermore, no significant difference were found between
the six types of mixed emotions measured in the primary stud-
ies, Q(5) = 8.06, n.s. Considering first the two types of mixed
emotions included within the dimensional approach, the aver-
age effect size for a mixed emotion formed from the combina-
tion of positive-negative was medium to large, dIG+ = 0.75,
95% CI =0.58–0.94. A medium effect size was observed for the
pair pleasure-displeasure, dIG+ = 0.61, 95% CI =0.28–0.93. A
comparison between the two pairs of mixed emotions within
the dimensional model of affect yielded no significant difference,
Q(1) = 0.99, n.s.
FIGURE 1 | Forest plot of effect sizes from included studies incorporating 95% CI. Note: The presentation of studies follows the alphabetic order displayed in
Table 1.
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TABLE 2 | Average effect sizes across models of affect and across
different types of mixed emotions.
Variable dIG+ SE K I
2
MODEL OF AFFECT
Dimensional 0.71** 0.09 24 0%
Discrete 0.81** 0.07 39 34.9%a
TYPE OF MIXED EMOTIONS CONSIDERED
Happy-sad 0.77** 0.07 29 17.1%
Fear-happy 1.28** 0.27 2 87.3%b
Disgust-amusement 1.07** 0.19 5 68.0%a
Hope-fear 0.53* 0.22 3 0%
Positive-negative 0.75** 0.09 19 0%
Pleasure-displeasure 0.60** 0.17 5 0%
SE and k are standard error and number of studies, respectively. I2 is a quantification of
the degree of heterogeneity calculated by I2 = 100% × (Q–df)/Q, where Q is Cochran’s
heterogeneity statistic and df the degrees of freedom (Higgins et al., 2003). **p < 0.01;
*p < 0.05. aQw significant at p < 0.05;
bQw significant at p < 0.01.
Turning now to the discrete mixed emotion pairs, there was
a medium to large effect size for the mixed emotion combi-
nation happy-sad, dIG+ = 0.77, 95% CI =0.62–0.92. A large
effect size was also found for the mix fear-happy, dIG+ = 1.28,
95% CI =0.74–1.82, and disgust-amused, dIG+ = 1.07, 95%
CI =0.69–1.44. Finally, a medium effect size was found for the
mixed emotion combination of hope-fear, dIG+ = 0.53, 95%
CI =0.08–0.97. These results indicate that different combinations
of mixed emotions all produced substantial effects.
Comparisons across the discrete pairs of mixed emotions
showed no significant differences between any of the pairs:
happy-sad and fear-happy, Q(1) = 2.63, n.s.; happy-sad and hope-
fear, Q(1) = 1.07, n.s.; happy-sad and disgust-amused, Q(1) =
1.85, p > 0.10; fear-happy and hope-fear, Q(1) = 1.93, n.s.;
fear-happy and disgust-amused, Q(1) = 0.10, p > 0.10; hope-
fear and disgust-amused, Q(1) = 1.94, n.s. It should be noted,
however, that high unexplained heterogeneity was found for the
mixed emotions fear-happy, Qw(1) = 7.90, p < 0.01, and
disgust-amusement, Qw(4) = 12.50, p < 0.05.
Moderators of the Effectiveness of Mixed
Emotions Elicitation
Several methodological factors and study characteristics were
tested as potential moderators of the effectiveness with which
mixed emotions were elicited (see Table 3). First, the type of
measure used to evaluate mixed emotions was tested. Studies
including the minimum index reported smaller effect sizes on
average compared to studies not using this measure, β = −0.20,
z = −1.97, p = 0.04. In contrast, direct measures of mixed
emotions reported marginally larger effect sizes than studies not
including this measure, β = 0.57, z = 1.92, p = 0.05. The use
of simultaneous measures and frequency-based measures did not
influence effect sizes.
In terms of the procedure used to induce mixed emotions,
none of the induction procedures influenced effect sizes (See
Table 3). Similarly, the type of experimental design, that is,
within-person designs or between-person designs, did not influ-
ence effect sizes. Finally, considering demographics characteris-
tics, themagnitude of themixed emotions effect was greater when
there was a higher percentage of women in the sample, β = 0.89,
z = 2.56, p = 0.01. Age did not influence the experience ofmixed
emotions.
Publication Biases
To determine whether the estimated effect sizes were biased
because of missing unpublished manuscripts with small or non-
significant effects, the distribution of the effect sizes observed
in the primary studies was examined using a funnel plot (see
Figure 2). The funnel plot showed some signs of asymmetry;
some studies with small standard errors were skewed toward
a positive effect, larger than the average effect size estimated.
However, statistical methods to detect publication bias did not
provide sufficient evidence that this bias was severe in the sam-
ple of studies. The Begg’s Rank Correlation method (Begg and
Mazumdar, 1994) did not show a significant presence of bias,
tau = 0.14, z = −1.284, p = 0.10. Furthermore, contemporary
methods to detect publication bias using a conditional estima-
tor (PET-PEESE; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014) did not reveal
the presence of severe distortions in the effect sizes (see Table 4).
Despite evidence of funnel plot asymmetry demonstrated by the
coefficients in the regression models (i.e., β1), results from apply-
ing PET-PEESE indicated that the null hypothesis that β0 = 0
using PET should be rejected and consequently the intercept
from PEESE should be used as the best estimate of the true effect
size. This was true considering both the full sample and sepa-
rate samples based on the distinction between dimensional and
discrete approaches.
Finally, a fail-safe N test for a meta-analytic random-effects
model (Rosenberg, 2005) determined that 167 unpublished stud-
ies with zero effect size would have to exist in order to overturn
the finding that mixed emotions are consistently elicited across
the primary studies. The fail-safe N test for a fixed-effects model,
similar to Rosenthal’s fail-safe N (1979), determined that more
than 10,000 studies would be needed to overturn the current find-
ings; this number exceeds the suggested tolerance value of 5n+10
(where n is the number of studies). Overall, the data appear to be
resilient to publication bias.
Discussion
This meta-analytic review examined the robustness with which
mixed emotions have been elicited across a variety of theoret-
ical and methodological contexts. Robustness was understood
as the stability of effect sizes across a variety of theoretical and
methodological conditions (Wimsatt, 1981). An assessment of
robustness is a desirable goal for any model of affect in order to
determine that accrued evidence is not a result of: methodological
artifacts, the selection of certain measures, emotional adjectives,
or chance. In relation to emotion theory, this evidence also con-
tributes toward the construction of a more comprehensive theory
of affect.
Accurate interpretation of research findings can be hampered
by the influence of design artifacts. Schmidt (2010) stated that an
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TABLE 3 | Moderators of the effectiveness of mixed emotions elicitation.
Moderator Regression coefficient Standard error k n 95% CI I2
INDICATOR OF MIXED EMOTIONS (ABSENT, PRESENT)
Minimum index −0.20* 0.10 28/35 2823/4334 −0.40/−0.01 0%
Simultaneous measure 0.10 0.17 55/8 6766/391 −0.23/0.43 77.2%b
Frequency 0.04 0.14 52/13 6046/1111 −0.23/0.31 0%
Subjective measure 0.57† 0.30 60/3 6417/740 −0.03/1.12 16.7%
Mix of measures 0.10 0.19 57/6 6576/581 −0.27/0.46 0%
MIXED EMOTIONS INDUCTION PROCEDURE (ABSENT, PRESENT)
Ads −0.25 0.16 56/7 6374/783 −0.55/0.06 0%
Films 0.07 0.14 51/12 6243/914 −0.21/0.35 66.3%b
Music 0.03 0.17 57/6 6720/437 −0.32/0.38 0%
Pictures −0.16 0.12 49/14 4383/2774 −0.40/0.07 0%
Personal experiences 0.04 0.19 57/6 6637/520 −0.33/0.40 0%
Simulation or imagination 0.18 0.13 48/15 5686/1471 −0.07/0.43 0%
Other 0.24 0.23 60/3 6899/258 −0.22/0.69 81.8%b
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
Within-person design 0.13 0.10 32 3619 −0.08/0.38 30.6%
Between-person design −0.13 0.11 31 3583 −0.34/0.08 0%
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Percentage of women (range 0%– 100%) 0.89** 0.25 46 5097 0.20/1.58 19.6%
Age (range 18–47 years) −0.01 0.01 27 3153 −0.02/0.02 10.2%
Columns k and n represent number of studies and number of participants, respectively. Where applicable, these are reported separately for each level of the moderator variable (indicated
in parentheses at the end of each moderator name). Where a variable is coded as “absent, present,” absent was coded as 0 and present was coded as 1; thus, a positive regression
coefficient indicates that studies in which the variable was present had larger effect sizes, and a negative regression coefficient indicates that studies where that variable was present
had smaller effect sizes. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10.b, Qw significant at p < 0.01.
FIGURE 2 | Funnel plot of effect sizes from included studies.
effective method of avoiding this problem in meta-analysis is to
use a random effects model so as to not leave significant variabil-
ity unaccounted for. Additionally, Schmidt urged researchers to
correct for the biasing effects of measurement errors when con-
ducting meta-analysis. In line with these recommendations, the
current research used a random effects model and corrected for
measurement error using the strongest study available, enhancing
confidence that the elicitation of mixed emotions appears a
non-artifactual emotional experience.
Numerous studies have investigated mixed emotions,
especially following several articles at the turn of the millennia
that debated the structure of affect and the possibility of expe-
riencing two opposite affects concurrently (e.g., Russell and
Carroll, 1999). The present meta-analytic review assessed the
evidence available and found that elicitation of mixed feelings
is a robust effect. The average effect size observed from k = 63
experimental studies was medium to high, and the effect-sizes
appeared to be resilient to publication bias. Furthermore, effect
sizes were of similar magnitude regardless of whether the struc-
ture of affect was considered as dimensional or discrete and no
significant difference was found when comparing effects from the
different models. These results might reflect something specific
to the emotions that have been studied, and in consequence,
should not be extrapolated to other emotion research domains
where the use of dimensional and discrete models of affect might
be still contentious. However, the findings do indicate that it is
unlikely that mixed emotions represent a peculiarity of certain
opposing emotions (e.g., happy-sad).
Furthermore, the present review found that use of the min-
imum index of mixed emotions was associated with smaller
effect sizes, whereas subjective measures of mixed emotions pro-
duced marginally greater effect sizes. It is possible that the min-
imum index is a more conservative indicator of the presence
of mixed emotions because it reflects the lower threshold in
the experience of mixed emotions rather than the intensity of
the overall experience. In contrast, subjective measures may be
more liberal in their estimation of mixed emotions because they
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TABLE 4 | Results from PET-PEESE indicator based on Stanley and
Doucouliagos (2014) approximation to reduce publication selection bias.
Sample PET PEESE
β0 β1 β0 β1
Full 0.41** (0.27, 0.54) 1.86** 0.53** (0.43, 0.63) 4.66**
MODEL OF AFFECT
Dimensional 0.38** (0.27, 0.48) 1.72** 0.47** (0.38, 0.55) 4.38**
Discrete 0.55** (0.21, 0.89) 1.28 0.66** (0.46, 0.86) 3.26
Full, the full sample. For PET and PEESE, β0, the intercept (i.e., the corrected estimate of
the overall effect); β1, the coefficient for standard error or variance (i.e., the test for funnel
plot asymmetry). Numbers given in parentheses are the lower and upper limits of the 95%
confidence intervals. **p < 0.01.
rely on self-reports of the direct experience of mixed emotions
and thereby encapsulate the integral experience of mixed emo-
tions. The larger effect size for subjective measures provides
preliminary support for the assumption that mixed emotions
are an integral experience. However, it is important to men-
tion that all the mixed emotions measures considered in the
present meta-analysis may suffer frommemory biases (Kihlstrom
et al., 2000), except the simultaneous measure of mixed
emotions.
One final finding of note is that gender moderated the elicita-
tion of mixed emotions. Specifically, the present findings suggest
that, compared to men, women either: (a) tend to experience
more intense mixed emotions in response to induction proce-
dures, (b) are more aware of experiencing mixed emotions, or (c)
aremore inclined to report the experience. Fujita et al. (1991) rec-
onciled previous research showing that women report as much
happiness as men but simultaneously also report greater unpleas-
ant affect, demonstrating that women experience more intense
positive emotions that balances any negative bias. Our results
may offer an alternative explanation that is based on a gender
difference in the experience or reporting of mixed emotions that
is not effectively or adequately captured by the most commonly
used affect measures.
Implications for Models of Affect
Despite notable divergences in the understanding of emotion
between dimensional and discrete models of affect, our findings
demonstrate consistent evidence of the activation of mixed emo-
tions using either dimensional (e.g., positive-negative affect) or
discrete emotion (e.g., happy, sad) concepts. However, it is less
clear under which circumstances the affect system follows a bipo-
lar relation between positive and negative affect or activates com-
plex affective experiences, such as mixed emotions. The evidence
presented here suggests that the critical question concerning the
structure of affect may not be how singular feelings relate, but
rather what conditions promote different activation patterns of
affect? This question is consistent with propositions found in a
number of emotion theories emphasizing the role of situations in
the conceptualization of affective experience (e.g., Arnold, 1960;
Zajonc, 1984; Parkinson, 1997; Clore and Ortony, 2013).
The consistent occurrence of mixed emotions points to an
affect system that is flexible enough to spontaneously permit
multiple activation patterns, ranging from bipolar affect reactions
to different blends of mixed emotions. This claim is supported by
recent evidence showing that mixed emotions involve particu-
lar physiological responses that are not simply reducible to their
constituent emotions (e.g., Henderson and Norris, 2013; Kreibig
et al., 2013), and is also consistent with some models of affect
reviewed here (e.g., Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1996; Cacioppo
et al., 2004).
Although recent findings in the field have made considerable
progresses in demonstrating that genuine co-activation could
be possible (e.g., Larsen and McGraw, 2011; Larsen and Green,
2013), one pending question in the field is whether mixed emo-
tions reflect the genuine co-activation of two opposite-affects
or merely the rapid succession between them. If propositions
derived from the ESM are correct, both co-activation and rapid
succession of affect may result in experiencing mixed emotions
(Norris et al., 2010; Cacioppo et al., 2011). We suggest that con-
ceptualizing mixed emotions as an integral distinctive experi-
ence that is more than the sum of its constituent emotions may
contribute to explain how different mechanisms produce mixed
emotions. The evidence presented here shows that the results for
subjective measures of mixed emotions are consistent with, but
not the same as, those for other types of mixed emotions mea-
sures. This offers some support to the notion of mixed emotions
as an integral experience, but as few studies have used this type
of measure to date such a conclusion may be premature and
warrants further examination.
Limitations and Future Directions
In accordance with the aims of the research, the current meta-
analysis was based exclusively on studies involving experimental
designs in order to provide controlled conditions to compare
the experience of mixed emotions. This limitation implies that
it is not possible to infer mixed emotions at the trait level, and
in consequence future studies should explore the robustness of
mixed emotions using ecologically valid methods, such as diary
studies. Future advances in understanding the functionality of
mixed emotions will also require the use of ecologically valid
methods. Several diary studies have explored the within-person
association between positive and negative affect (e.g., Diener and
Iran-Nejad, 1986; Ong and Bergeman, 2004), so it would be inter-
esting to analyze these and additional studies of the same kind to
determine the natural conditions under which people tend to feel
more mixed emotions. For example, previous studies have shown
that some people tend to experience more mixed emotions under
stressful situations, and that these emotional experiences can pro-
vide a buffer against the negative impact of stress in their lives
(Reich et al., 2003; Davis et al., 2004). This evidence might illu-
minate the investigation of the contextual conditions that elicit
mixed emotions and also exploring efficacy of interventions that
aim to produce change in mixed emotions.
Additionally, it is worth noting that the present review inves-
tigated the hypothesis that mixed emotions are consistently acti-
vated across different theoretical and methodological conditions.
This involved testing the null hypothesis that following an induc-
tion people did not experience more mixed emotions than a
control group, leading to effect sizes close to zero. However, in
line with assumptions derived from the ESM which suggests that
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the affect system can operate in multiple modes of activation
(Cacioppo et al., 1999, 2004), future studies should investigate
under which circumstances the affect system tends to activate one
affect exclusively or two affects concurrently.
Another limitation of the present meta-analytic review is that
it has only considered studies that have explicitly investigated
the activation of mixed emotions, and not other studies in which
positive and negative affect have been measured. Theoretically, it
would be possible to calculate a mixed emotions index for those
studies, but in practice reported values typically refer to average
scores from which it is not possible to infer an appropriate esti-
mation of mixed emotions. Future emotion research would be
enhanced by researchers heeding the potential presence of mixed
emotions when measuring emotion.
We also hope that the present results concerning mixed emo-
tions will motivate researchers to explore whether the presence
of mixed emotions can expand our understanding of common
emotion-related outcomes, such as well-being and behavior. Both
the ESM (Cacioppo et al., 1999, 2004) and the communicative
model of emotion (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1996) anticipate
that one consequence of experiencing mixed emotions is that
they enable disparate courses of action to be followed. In addi-
tion, we suggest that the experience of mixed emotions may
be important in assisting behavioral equilibration and sense-
making processes. Following Piaget’s conceptualizations, Bless
and Fiedler (2006) have suggested that positive affect is related
to assimilative, heuristic processing styles; whereas negative affect
has been linked to accommodative, analytical processing styles.
Using the same Piagetian analogy, we propose that mixed emo-
tions are more likely to be associated with equilibration which
is the process through which complex information is incorpo-
rated to restore behavioral control. Hence, mixed emotions may
be the hallmark of a versatile affect system that provides advan-
tages in flexibly interpreting a complex environment and learning
to deliver adaptive responses, but that hallmark has yet to be
established.
Conclusion
The current meta-analysis has made four distinct contributions
to the study of mixed emotions. First, it has demonstrated that
mixed emotions are a robust and non-artifactual experience. The
evidence provided here shows that the average effect size for the
elicitation of mixed emotions is medium-to-large in magnitude,
and that the effect is similar across different types of mixed emo-
tions. Second, this meta-analysis has contributed to the integra-
tion of the field of mixed emotions by demonstrating that mixed
emotions have been elicited when conceptualized as dimensions
or as discrete entities. Third, the effect size for mixed emotions
was shown to be sensitive to the type ofmeasure used (it is smaller
for minimum index measures, and larger for direct measures)
and to the gender makeup of the sample (larger for women)
but not to the type of induction procedure used. Fourth, the
results for the limited set of studies using subjectivemeasures per-
mit speculation that mixed emotions experience might be more
than the sum of its constituent emotions, suggesting the impor-
tance of further investigating the subjective experience of mixed
emotions. Overall, this meta-analysis provides a foundation for
conducting further research on the nature, causes, and effects of
mixed emotions, and to develop a more comprehensive theory of
emotional complexity, which will refine our understanding of the
emotional palette.
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